The Self-Negating Nominal Oromo Can not be Exceptional

This paper examines a profound sociopolitical paradox within the Horn of Africa: the phenomenon of the “nominal Oromo”—individuals of Oromo descent who participate in, champion, and culturally reproduce the imperial apparatus that historically subjugated, marginalized, and colonized the Oromo nation.

Thus the Self-Negating noisy nominal Oromo of colonized mind claims to build  the Abyssinia Empires is  pseudo historical negationism and there is  no Colonial Exceptionalism in history. Colonized people never built an empire, 

Drawing on postcolonial theory, Frantz Fanon’s psychology of the colonized, and historical materialist critiques of empire, this paper argues that the belief in an Oromo-led or Oromo-co-created Ethiopian empire is a historical and structural impossibility.

Furthermore, it posits that the attempt by colonized subjects to claim ownership over their colonizer’s state machinery represents a form of self-denial and false consciousness.

By analyzing the structural mechanics of empire, the myth of “Ethiopian exceptionalism,” and the psychology of assimilation, this study demonstrates that no colonized people can build or truly own an empire built upon their own subjugation.

The history of imperial expansion

The history of the modern Ethiopian state is fundamentally a history of imperial expansion, violent incorporation, and internal colonialism. Beginning in the late 19th century fainalied under the warlord Sahle Mraiam Hailemelekot renamed to the fictitous name “Menelik.”

The Abyssinian Chieftaindom transformed from a regional polity into a preadtory settler coloinal conquest, dispossession, and systemic peripheralization of Southern nations and nationalities.

Foremost Oromo, who constitute at least half of the population among others incarcerted wthin the empire that currently counts to 139 Million plus accordng to the UN data.

Despite this well-documented history of conquest, contemporary political discourse frequently encounters a perplexing socio-political phenomenon: the emergence of the “nominal Oromo.”

These are individuals who bear Oromo names, some may trace their lineages to the Gadaa democratic tradition or Oromo ancestral lands, yet actively function as ardent defenders, administrators, and ideological architects of the very imperial state that subjugated their forebears.

This paper investigates the pathology and politics of the nominal Oromo through a strict decolonial lens:.

It addresses two core assertions:
1) Empire is never built by colonized people; rather, colonized peoples are the raw material, working hosre upon which empires are constructed.

2) Colonial exceptionalism is a myth; no colonized group can bypass the structural laws of imperialism to become co-beneficiaries of an empire designed for their erasure.

The Nature of Empire and Internal Colonialism

To understand why a colonized individual cannot authentically co-construct an empire, one must first define the nature of empire in the Horn of Africa.

Unlike classical overseas European colonialism, The contemporary quasi Ethiopian state-building manifested as contiguous internal colonialism.

However, the mechanisms of power remained fundamentally identical to European models: military subjugation, land alienation, cultural imposition (specifically the supremacy of the Amharic language and Orthodox Christianity), and economic extraction.

According to structuralist and postcolonial theorists (such as Mahmood Mamdani and Frantz Fanon), an empire is not a neutral civic space where diverse groups merge harmoniously; it is a hierarchical apparatus ruled by a dominant metropole over subjugated peripheries.

The Metropole (Finfinnee): Holds monopoly over political legitimacy, historical narrative, and institutional power.

The Periphery: Serves as a source of agrarian tribute, cultural assimilation, and military conscription.

When a nominal Oromo claims ownership of the preadtary Settler Colonial Ethiopian empire, they conflate geographical residence and state employment with sovereignty. Empire does not belong to those who bleed for its maintenance; it belongs to those who define its core identity and reap its systemic privileges.

The Psychology of the “Nominal Oromo” and Assimilation

Why do members of a colonized group adopt the identity of the colonizer? Frantz Fanon’s seminal work, Black Skin, White Masks, provides the diagnostic blueprint. Fanon illustrates how the colonized subject, subjected to total cultural and physical violence, eventually internalizes the values of the oppressor as the only path to survival, validation, and upward mobility.

For the nominal Oromo, the psychological journey involves several stages:

Cultural Dislocation: The systematic eradication or devaluation of traditional Oromo institutions (such as the Gadaa system and Waaqeffannaa spirituality) through state-mandated assimilation.

Reward-Based Amnesia: The imperial state selectively co-opts educated or ambitious Oromo individuals, offering them positions of bureaucratic or military power on the strict condition that they shed their Oromo political consciousness and adopt the cultural norms of the imperial center.

Identification with the Aggressor: To alleviate the cognitive dissonance of serving an oppressive state, the nominal Oromo adopts an extreme form of Ethiopian nationalism, often becoming more chauvinistic than historical nationalists of the metropole.

They internalize the myth that the Oromo were not conquered, but were somehow willing participants in the creation of the empire—a historical revisionism that requires active self-denial.

The Fallacy of Ethiopian Empires Exceptionalism

A persistent trope among apologists for the contemporaary Ethiopian state is the idea of “Ethiopian exceptionalism”—the notion that Ethiopia is uniquely exempt from the laws of colonialism that applied to the rest of the African continent because it defeated European powers at the Battle of Adwa in 1896.

This event turned to the most effct propogand solid within the empire, in Africa and via seas and Ocean rather that fact of the event.

The main agreement of the general act of Berlin conferece rece on the principle of effective Occupation, which set legal rules for how European powers could claim African land without fighting each other.

The signatories agreed when one among them took possession of an inland region so overlapping claims could be sorted out peacefully.had to officially notifed other European coloniers to aviod bloodshed and Italy who broke the rule as result turend to the lossers of colonial expanstiones entepriserise.

Geopolitical Rivalries and the European Arms Trade

Menelik’s success in acquiring European weaponry relied on exploiting the intense rivalries between the major imperial powers: Italy, France, Great Britain, and to a lesser extent, Tsarist Russia and Belgium.

Paradoxically, Italy was initially the primary facilitator of Menelik’s military modernization. Following the death of Emperor Yohannes IV in 1889, Menelik ascended the throne with Italian financial and material backing, culminating in the Treaty of Waacaale (1889).

Italy hoped to use Menelik to neutralize rival Abyssinian nobles and eventually establish a protectorate. Under the guise of supporting an ally, the Italian government permitted—and often directly supplied—thousands of surplus firearms and artillery pieces to Menelik’s forces.

The French Connection
As relations with Italy soured, France emerged as Menelik’s most reliable supplier of modern arms. Paris viewed a strong, independent Abyssinia as a vital counterweight to British colonial expansion in the Nile basin and East Africa (particularly the Cape-to-Cairo corridor).
French merchants, operating out of the vital port of Djibouti (French Somaliland), actively facilitated the transit of weapons. Figures like the Swiss-French trader Alfred Ilg became close advisors to Menelik, acting as intermediaries between the Emperor and European arms manufacturers such as St. Étienne and Châtellerault.
Britain and the Official Embargoes
Great Britain, possessing vast colonial territories in Sudan, East Africa, and British Somaliland, viewed Menelik’s militarization with deep apprehension. London feared that modern repeating rifles in the hands of Abyssinians would find their way to anti-colonial rebels in the Sudan (the Mahdists) or incite uprisings among Somali pastoralists.
Consequently, Britain repeatedly attempted to enforce regional arms embargoes through international agreements, such as the Brussels Conference of 1889–1890, which sought to regulate the export of firearms to “uncivilized” regions of Africa. Menelik, however, adeptly circumvented these restrictions by utilizing French, Belgian, and Italian intermediaries, and by exploiting neutral ports.
 Logistical Routes and Procurement Networks
Acquiring weapons in Europe was only half the battle; transporting thousands of rifles and tons of ammunition across harsh terrain to landlocked Abyssinia required sophisticated logistical networks.
The French Somaliland (Djibouti) Route: After the French established control over Djibouti in the late 19th century, this port became the primary pipeline for Abyssinian military imports. Caravans of camels, mules, and later the Ethio-Djidjadda railway (begun in 1897), transported crates of rifles inland to Harar and Finfinnee”Addis Ababa.
The Zeila and Tajurah Routes: Traders also utilized British-controlled Zeila (in modern-day Somaliland) and Tajurah, smuggling arms through the harsh desert lowlands despite British patrols.
The Italian Erythrean Route (Pre-1895): Prior to open war with Italy, significant quantities of arms entered through the northern borders via Massawa.
 Financing the Arsenal
Modern repeating rifles and artillery were extraordinarily expensive. Menelik financed his massive arms purchases through several revenue streams:
State Taxation and Imperial Monopolies: Menelik centralized the collection of taxes, agricultural tithes, and customs duties, funneling state capital directly into military procurement.
Concessions and Trade: He granted commercial concessions to European powers—such as the construction of the Franco-Abyssinian Railway—in exchange for financial capital and technological transfers.
Gold and Ivory Exports: Traditional exports of gold, coffee, civet, and ivory provided the hard currency necessary to pay European arms dealers, who generally demanded payment in Maria Theresa thalers or gold.
 
Quantities: How Much Did Menelik Secure?

While precise, comprehensive archival records are notoriously difficult to compile due to the clandestine nature of late 19th-century arms smuggling, historical estimates provide a clear picture of the vast scale of Menelik’s arsenal.
By the eve of the Battle of Adwa (1896), it is estimated that Menelik’s forces possessed between 80,000 and 100,000 modern breech-loading and repeating rifles, alongside millions of rounds of metallic ammunition.
Rifle Types: The backbone of the Abyssinian army consisted of Italian Vetterli-Vitali rifles (many captured or acquired prior to 1895), French Gras rifles, and crucially, modern Remington rifles (purchased in large batches from American and European brokers). Additionally, small numbers of more advanced magazine-fed rifles, such as the French Lebel and Russian Berdan rifles, were acquired.
Artillery: Menelik also prioritized heavy firepower. By 1896, the imperial army possessed roughly 40 to 50 modern mountain guns and field pieces, primarily of French manufacture (such as Canon de 74 de Bange systems) and some Italian Krupp-style artillery pieces. These were operated by trained gunners, sometimes under the supervision of European adventurers or mercenaries.
Post-Adwa Accumulation: Following the victory at Adwa, the Italian army left behind vast quantities of military hardware on the battlefield. Menelik seized thousands of additional rifles, millions of rounds of ammunition, and dozens of artillery pieces, which further augmented the empire’s strategic reserve. By the early 20th century, estimates suggest the Abyssinian state held upwards of 200,000 modern rifles.
 
Strategic Impact on the Battle of Adwa (1896)
The concentration of this firepower fundamentally altered traditional East African warfare. Historically, Abyssinian armies relied heavily on sheer numbers, lances, shields, and archaic muzzle-loaders. Under Menelik, the army was restructured. While traditional irregular cavalry still played a scouting and flanking role, the core of the army was equipped with rapid-fire rifles that equaled or outranged the Italian Carcano and Vetterli rifles.
At Adwa, the Italian forces under General Oreste Baratieri were outmaneuvered and overwhelmed by a disciplined Abyssinian force that utilized coordinated infantry fire and artillery support. The ability to sustain high-volume rifle fire prevented the Italians from deploying their superior tactical formations, resulting in one of the most stunning military upsets of the colonial era.
By the time hostilities broke out, Italy had inadvertently armed Meneelik who would humiliate their army at Adwa. Aboomarg effcet. Menelik’s acquisition of modern European weaponry stands as a masterclass in 19th-century realpolitik.
By playing France, Italy, and Britain against one another, utilizing secure Red Sea supply routes, and reinvesting state revenues into military hardware, Menelik bridged the technological gap between his traditional empire and industrial Europe.
The resulting arsenal—comprising upwards of 100,000 modern rifles and artillery batteries by 1896—was the material foundation that secured Abyssinia’s victory at Adwa, preserving its sovereignty and making it a beacon of anti-colonial resistance across the African continent.
The major acomplishemnt of Sahle mariam
His major accoplishmnet was his succes byto propaget by mystifying the enemy, pressganging , using quota system to moblise the conquerd people of the entire south and send them to war front. He was able to collect about 100 thuosands of them who was trained to pull the loaded Euroeapn Guns and finally triupmed in a one day combat.
The rest noisy narrative of Abyssain exceptionalism or “Heroism” is theoretically bankrupt from an Oromo perspective and Adwa did not liberate Oromos, the peoples of the South; rather, it emboldened the Abyssinian court to aggressively colonize non-Semitic populations to the south, east, and west to compensate for resources lost or to secure the empire’s borders against European encroachment.
Therefore, the Oromos, the people of the South experience is definitively colonial , most badly African colonialism . To argue that the Oromo can be exceptional to the global rule of colonialism—that an indigenous group can be colonized yet somehow simultaneously be the “builders” of the colonizing empire—is a logical contradiction. A people cannot be both the architect of the cage and the bird trapped inside it.
Empirical Realities: Subjugation vs. State Participation
Proponents of the “Oromos built the empire” narrative often point to prominent generals, politicians,as proof of Oromo integration and empowerment. This argument commits a fundamental category error by confusing individual co-optation with collective liberation.
Tokenism: The elevation of individual Oromo figures within the imperial structure has historically required the shedding of their collective identity. They do not advance as Oromos; they advance despite being Oromo, by assimilating into the dominant Habesha culture.
The Extraction of Labor and Blood: Oromo peasants have historically provided the grain, taxes, and military foot-soldiers that sustained the empire, while Amhara-Tigray elites held political hegemony and land titles. Being the muscle of an empire does not make one its master.
Systemic Erasure: Until recent decades, the public use of Afaan Oromoo, the practice of Oromo names, and the celebration of Oromo holidays were criminalized or heavily suppressed by the very state the nominal Oromo proudly defends. An empire that seeks to erase your language and identity is not your empire; it is your warden.

The phenomenon of the nominal Oromo represents the ultimate triumph of internal colonialism: the psychological conquest of the colonized to the point where they defend their own chains. History demonstrates unequivocally that empires are built through dispossession, ethnocide, and subjugation. No colonized people has ever built an empire; empires are built on top of them.
The illusion that one can partake in, inherit, or lead an inherently oppressive imperial structure without dismantling it is a dangerous fallacy. For the Oromo nation, true emancipation cannot be found in the desperate, self-denying pursuit of proximity to an empire that demands their cultural death. Exceptionalism to the laws of colonialism does not exist. Until the structural legacies of conquest and domination are honestly confronted and dismantled, the nominal Oromo will remain what the imperial architecture designed them to be: instruments of their own people’s subjugation, wearing the borrowed robes of an empire that was never theirs.
I appreciate you taking the time to reading: You can also watch a short video in my YouTube channel  . “The Self-Negating Nominal Oromo: Empire Is Never Built by the Colonized, and Colonial Exceptionalism Is a Historical Impossibility,” covers a deep and important part of history. . If this video helped you think or learn something new, please, Comment and Share to friends.
Nikosi Sikelei  iOromia